12 Point suggestion on Tibet by Chinese Intellectuals

Beijing, March 22, 2008

Twelve Suggestions for Dealing with the Tibetan Situation by Some Chinese Intellectuals

1. At present the one-sided propaganda of the official Chinese media is having the effect of stirring up inter-ethnic animosity and aggravating an already tense situation. This is extremely detrimental to the long-term goal of safeguarding national unity. We call for such propaganda to be stopped.

2. We support the Dalai Lama’s appeal for peace, and hope that the ethnic conflict can be dealt with according to the principles of goodwill, peace, and non-violence. We condemn any violent act against innocent people, strongly urge the Chinese government to stop the violent suppression, and appeal to the Tibetan people likewise not to engage in violent activities.

3. The Chinese government claims that “there is sufficient evidence to prove this incident was organized, premeditated, and meticulously orchestrated by the Dalai clique.” We hope that the government will show proof of this. In order to change the international community’s negative view and distrustful attitude, we also suggest that the government invite the United Nation’s Commission on Human Rights to carry out an independent investigation of the evidence, the course of the incident, the number of casualties, etc.

4. In our opinion, such Cultural-Revolution-like language as “the Dalai Lama is a jackal in Buddhist monk’s robes and an evil spirit with a human face and the heart of a beast ” used by the Chinese Communist Party leadership in the Tibet Autonomous Region is of no help in easing the situation, nor is it beneficial to the Chinese government’s image. As the Chinese government is committed to integrating into the international community, we maintain that it should display a style of governing that conforms to the standards of modern civilization.

5. We note that on the very day when the violence erupted in Lhasa (March 14), the leaders of the Tibet Autonomous Region declared that “there is sufficient evidence to prove this incident was organized, premeditated, and meticulously orchestrated by the Dalai clique.” This shows that the authorities in Tibet knew in advance that the riot would occur, yet did nothing effective to prevent the incident from happening or escalating. If there was a dereliction of duty, a serious investigation must be carried out to determine this and deal with it accordingly.

6. If in the end it cannot be proved that this was an organized, premeditated, and meticulously orchestrated event but was instead a “popular revolt” triggered by events, then the authorities should pursue those responsible for inciting the popular revolt and concocting false information to deceive the Central Government and the people; they should also seriously reflect on what can be learned from this event so as to avoid taking the same course in the future.

7. We strongly demand that the authorities not subject every Tibetan to political investigation or revenge. The trials of those who have been arrested must be carried out according to judicial procedures that are open, just, and transparent so as to ensure that all parties are satisfied.

8. We urge the Chinese government to allow credible national and international media to go into Tibetan areas to conduct independent interviews and news reports. In our view, the current news blockade cannot gain credit with the Chinese people or the international community, and is harmful to the credibility of the Chinese government. If the government grasps the true situation, it need not fear challenges. Only by adopting an open attitude can we turn around the international community’s distrust of our government.

9. We appeal to the Chinese people and overseas Chinese to be calm and tolerant, and to reflect deeply on what is happening. Adopting a posture of aggressive nationalism will only invite antipathy from the international community and harm China’s international image.

10. The disturbances in Tibet in the 1980s were limited to Lhasa, whereas this time they have spread to many Tibetan areas. This deterioration indicates that there are serious mistakes in the work that has been done with regard to Tibet. The relevant government departments must conscientiously reflect upon this matter, examine their failures, and fundamentally change the failed nationality policies.

11. In order to prevent similar incidents from happening in future, the government must abide by the freedom of religious belief and the freedom of speech explicitly enshrined in the Chinese Constitution, thereby allowing the Tibetan people fully to express their grievances and hopes, and permitting citizens of all nationalities freely to criticize and make suggestions regarding the government’s nationality policies.

12. We hold that we must eliminate animosity and bring about national reconciliation, not continue to increase divisions between nationalities. A country that wishes to avoid the partition of its territory must first avoid divisions among its nationalities. Therefore, we appeal to the leaders of our country to hold direct dialogue with the Dalai Lama. We hope that the Chinese and Tibetan people will do away with the misunderstandings between them, develop their interactions with each other, and achieve unity. Government departments as much as popular organizations and religious figures should make great efforts toward this goal.

Signatures:

Wang Lixiong (Beijing, Writer)
Liu Xiaobo (Beijing, Freelance Writer)
Zhang Zuhua (Beijing, scholar of constitutionalism)
Sha Yexin (Shanghai, writer, Chinese Muslim)
Yu Haocheng (Beijing, jurist)
Ding Zilin (Beijing, professor)
Jiang peikun (Beijing, professor)
Yu Jie (Beijing, writer)
Sun Wenguang (Shangdong, professor)
Ran Yunfei (Sichuan, editor, Tujia nationality)
Pu Zhiqiang (Beijing, lawyer)
Teng Biao (Beijing, Layer and scholar)
Liao Yiwu ()Sichuan, writer)
Wang Qisheng (Beijing, scholar)
Zhang Xianling (Beijing, engineer)
Xu Jue (Beijing, research fellow)
Li Jun (Gansu, photographer)
Gao Yu (Beijing, journalist)
Wang Debang (Beijing, freelance writer)
Zhao Dagong (Shenzhen, freelance writer)
Jiang Danwen (Shanghai, writer)
Liu Yi (Gansu, painter)
Xu Hui (Beijing, writer)
Wang Tiancheng (Beijing, scholar)
Wen kejian (Hangzhou, freelance)
Li Hai (Beijing, freelance writer)
Tian Yongde (Inner Mongolia, folk human rights activists)
Zan Aizong (Hangzhou, journalist)
Liu Yiming (Hubei, freelance writer)
Liu Di (Beijing, freelance writer)

Sources:

http://www.indiaabroad.com/news/2008/mar/23tibetrow.htm

http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/03/24/asia/chinasub.php

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/24/world/asia/24china.html?em&ex=1206417600&en=e4a05bcf4c42d15b&ei=5087%0A

TibetTalk forbidden by the Peoples Republic of China

I just found out from a comment by a reader named Dava that “Tibettalk” has been added to a list of a thousand search terms forbidden by the Peoples Republic of China

“Hi Jigme-laa,

I just thought you’d like to know that “Tibetalk” has been honored as one of the thousand “search terms” forbidden by the Peoples Republic.

I imagine you may not especially feel great being placed in the company of all those obscenities. Does it bother you at all?

The list has been put up here:

http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2004/08/the-words-you-never-see-in-chinese-cyberspace/

In Tinyurl: http://tinyurl.com/2nqc2u

Have a look!

The moral is, if you really would only like top party leaders to read your blog, type all those words into your “subject” box. No guarantees, but you can be pretty sure most people in the PRC won’t be able to go there.

Yours,
Dava”

Should the Dalai Lama step down from politics?

By: Jigme Duntak

See Article: Electing a New Dalai Lama

In this article by exiled Tibetan writer and activist Jamyang Norbu, the issue of the Dalai Lama’s political role is discussed. He believes that the Dalai Lama should modify his role to that of a constitutional monarchy comparable to that of the King of Thailand’s. Jamyang explains that in this way “His Holiness need not be burdened with the routine problems of government or with the unpleasant squabbles and strife of political life, but still retain a constitutional role to advise perhaps even arbitrate, in the case of a major national crisis.”

“The system we have now can in no way be regarded as a genuine democracy. The closest thing I can think of is Nepal’s former “panchayat” democracy. You can also quite safely compare it to those “managed” or “guided” democracies that you find in Russia, Zimbabwe, and other places in the third world.“

Jamyang also believes that by giving full political power to the Tibetan people, this would in fact help in dealing with the eventual absence of the Dalai Lama by maintaining the hope and unity of Tibetans and averting a possible breakdown of the governmental system.

“…the promise of a true democratic Tibet will be an effective repudiation of repeated Chinese propaganda claims that Tibetan independence would mean a reversion to theocratic feudalism”

“…the early and effective implementation of a genuine democratic process in our exile-society becomes a clear proof to the Tibetan people of the Dalai Lama’s absolute sincerity in his commitment to democracy for Tibet”.

Jamyang believes that there are many Tibetans who wish to make their marks on Tibetan politics and make a difference in their society but he believes they are marginalized by the lack of the ability to truly effectuate change due to the lack of real power within the government. By giving real power to the Tibetan Government in Exile he believes this will help bolster the ranks of it’s current demoralized officials, who largely leave in large numbers to emigrate to the West.

“…the Kashag (the advisory board of the Tibetan government-in-exile) and the Assembly are marginalized in terms of real political power and have no meaningful role in formulation of national policy”.

The Tibetan people’s strong criticism of the current Tibetan government while praising the Dalai Lama is also said by Jamyang to be linked to the administration disregard by foreign officials who instead choose to deal directly with the Dalai Lama.

“Gradually the government has become marginalized and even Beijing has managed to add to this with its so-called “negotiation” that has created the impression that the Tibet issue is nothing but a personal matter of the Dalai Lama’s return”.

“…[during] the Gold Medal ceremony at Washington DC, it was observed that some front-row seats at the function were reserved for heads of Dharma centres in the West, such as Sogyal Rimpoche and Nyarakhentul Rimpoche. The Tibetans involved in the organizing had not even bothered to issue an invitation to the Speaker of the Tibetan Parliament-in-exile, who I understand was finally instructed by Parliament to attend, and just managed to do so at the last minute.”

“If the Tibetan Parliament and Kashag continually become sidelined and trivialized, then the government-in-exile will almost certainly collapse when His Holiness is not with us. The only way for it to survive and even gain legitimacy and authority is if Tibetan people all over the world feel they have a direct stake in its formation and operation, and also feel that their participation in the process is necessary, meaningful, and will bring about genuine results. Such an outcome can only be realized through a multi-party based democracy. Such a system, because of the role of a standing legitimate opposition, will also produce accountability and when required, change. No other system will be able to keep the Tibetans united when His Holiness is not with us.”

See Article: As Dalai Lama gains, Tibetans lose

In this article by Claude Arpi, an expert on Tibetan history, Arpi writes that as the Dalai Lama is recognized with international awards and honorary citizen awards, Tibetans in Tibet are further oppressed by harsher measures by the Chinese government which are directly in retaliation of these awards.

“When the Dalai Lama received the Gold Medal in the Washington, the Chinese authorities, recalling the massive demonstrations of 1987, deployed the PAP in several strategic monasteries. Another incident of shooting at Tibetans fleeing to Nepal through the Nangpa Pass was reported on October 18; nine have gone missing and four were arrested from the original group of 46 Tibetans.”

See Article: Dalai Lama must balance politics, spiritual role

In this article the authors write about how the Dalai Lama “must balance the concerns of a wary Indian government – which hosts his government in exile – and the desperation that Tibetans in China have expressed through their recent unrest”. The Dalai Lama also must “as a Buddhist monk, match his words and actions in the worldly political arena with the nonviolent philosophy at the heart of his spiritual practice”.

“What the Dalai Lama is currently doing is walking a tightrope,” says Srikanth Kondapalli, a Tibet expert at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi.

That balancing act, adds John Bellezza, a Tibet scholar who knows the Dalai Lama, is made all the harder because “his temporal and spiritual leadership don’t always harmonize as well as they might. Many of his difficulties are due to the underlying tensions he feels between the two hats that he wears.”

For now, however, the Dalai Lama “is the only unifying force” capable of delivering any kind of agreement with Beijing, says Baker. “If he disappears,” he says, “all the pent-up frustrations will arise in ways that no one will have the moral authority to control any longer.”

See Article: China Needs the Dalai Lama
In this article by professor of Indo-Tibetan Buddhist Studies Robert Thurman, The Dalai Lama is said to be vital to the Chinese government if they wish to solve the current problems in Tibet.

“the Nobel Laureate, the living Gandhi, and the apostle of nonviolence, intelligent dialogue, and unbending hope. He has all along continued to offer them the open hand of friendship, aiming to find a solution that will be satisfying for China as well as for Tibet. It’s time, now, for President Hu Jintao to reach out and welcome his help”.

Discussion:

Should the Dalai Lama step down from politics?

Would the granting of real political powers to the Tibetan government:

1. Entice more Tibetans to get involved in their own government?
2. Repudiate Chinese propaganda claims that Tibetan independence would mean a reversion to theocratic feudalism?
3. Eliminate the Chinese oppressive reactionary measures against the Tibetan people in Tibet whenever the Dalai Lama is given praise through awards by various countries?
4. Allow the policies of the Tibetan people to reflect the will of the Tibetan people through democratic process and representation?
5. Help the Tibetan government in possibly being recognized in international politics? (See Article: Reflections on a political solution)
6. Diminish the Dalai Lama’s abilities to help the Chinese government and Tibetan people in finding a solution to the problems of Tibet and its people?

Lhasa riot reports show media bias in West

By Ye Jun (China Daily)
Updated: 2008-03-22 09:04

Chinese netizens, including students studying overseas, have been angered by biased and sometimes dishonest reports about the recent riots in Tibet by some Western media.

Pictures from some media websites, including CNN and BBC, with untrue reports about the riots have been posted on chatrooms, drawing criticism.

“I used to think the Western media were fair. But how could they turn a blind eye to the killing and arson by rioters?” asked a posting at pic.qikoo.com.

The pictures illustrate how news can be manipulated.

The BBC News website carries a picture with the caption saying “There is a heavy military presence in Lhasa”, while the photo clearly shows an ambulance bearing the red cross symbol.

The American Fox News website published a photo with the caption “Chinese troops parade handcuffed Tibetan prisoners in trucks”, while the photo shows Indian police dragging a man away.

CNN.com used a cropped photo of Chinese military trucks, cutting off the half of the picture showing a crowd of rioters throwing rocks at the trucks.

More notably, the websites of Germany’s Bild newspaper, N-TV and RTL TV, and the Washington Post all used pictures of baton-wielding Nepalese police in clashes with Tibetan protesters in Kathmandu, claiming that the officers were Chinese police.

“To tarnish China’s image, the West is doing whatever they can, no mater how mean and vicious,” said one netizen on www.huanqiu.com.

“Is this what they call Western democracy and freedom of speech?” asked another netizen.

Huai Bao, a student studying filmmaking in Vancouver, Canada, said: “I have read some news and online discussions made by those who have never been to Tibet, who have zero knowledge about China and the history of Tibet. These people have no rights to comment on Tibet.”

Bao, from Beijing, became a believer in Tibetan Buddhism after meeting his master, a high-profile lama, in the Chinese capital.

He said that some Tibetan monks set fire to shops, schools and hospitals, and attacked Han and Tibetan people, including women and children.

“My master told me that the monks involved in the riots were not real monks, as violence and crimes are absolutely against the teachings of Buddha,” he wrote in an e-mail to China Daily.

Netizens also mentioned a blog (kadfly.blogspot.com) run by a group of Western tourists traveling in Tibet during the riot, where photos and video clips of Tibet are posted.

Although their photos were used by the New York Times and the BBC, the following words did not make it into the Western press.

One blogger wrote: “I want to make one thing clear because all of the major news outlets are ignoring a very important fact the protests yesterday were NOT peaceful.”

He wrote that all of the eyewitnesses agreed that “the protesters went from attacking Chinese police to attacking innocent people very, very quickly. They appeared to target Muslim and Han Chinese individuals and businesses first but many Tibetans were also caught in the crossfire.”

A video clip was posted on the blog, in which a Han motorcyclist, an obvious passerby, was stoned by a crowd of mob.

Bao said there is a unanimous feeling of anger among his Chinese friends in Vancouver.

“Any news about China has to be negative so that they will believe it – from ‘poisonous toys to poisonous dumplings’. Some foreign media have a particular interest in bashing China over human rights and pollution. They turn a blind eye to all progressive changes.”

Dalai Lama holds key to peace in Tibet

By ERIC MARGOLIS, TORONTO SUN

The latest Tibetan rebellion against Chinese rule has captured world sympathy and horribly embarrassed China’s government just as Beijing has been pulling out all the stops preparing for its summer Olympic extravaganza.

But is there anything the world community can do besides issuing more platitudes?First, some questions.

Is Tibet historically part of China, as Beijing claims? Yes and no. Tibet was spiritually linked to China from about 1370 in a “priest-ruler” relationship. Tibet’s Lamaist Buddhist theocracy recognized the ultimate temporal power of China’s emperor, while the emperor recognized Lhasa’s spiritual primacy and total autonomy. Lhasa became the Vatican for the Mongol Empire and its successor, China’s Ming Empire.

In 1913, while China was in chaos, Tibet, backed by the British Empire, declared independence. So it remained until October 1950, when the People’s Army invaded Tibet and declared it “reunited” to China. A year earlier, Chinese troops had invaded and crushed the independent Republic of East Turkistan — today called Xinjiang — whose Turkic-Mongol Uighurs, long fought Chinese rule and Han Chinese immigration.

The world laments for the fashionable cause of Tibetans, but utterly ignores their northern neighbours, the Uighurs. After 2001, the Bush administration even branded Muslim Uighur resistance movements as “terrorists.”

Second, the true number of Tibetans. China has obscured census figures. When I met with the Dalai Lama, who inspired my book, War at the Top of the World — which is in part about Tibet — he told me there were over seven million Tibetans. About three million are in Tibet proper, and the rest in the neighbouring Chinese provinces of Sichuan, Gansu and Qinghai, to which protests spread this week.

A primary cause of the Tibetan “intifada” is continuing settlement of Han Chinese. After what I call “ethnic inundation,” ethnic Chinese settlers now outnumber Tibetans. The same process of inundation occurred in Inner Mongolia, whose people are ethnically close to Tibetans.

Ironically, China condemns Israel for colonizing the West Bank with Jewish settlers while China does the same thing in Tibet.

MODERNIZATION

But China also has uplifted Tibet from frightful poverty and superstition, brought education, hospitals, electricity, roads, and ended widespread serfdom. Last year, a remarkable new high altitude rail line linked Lhasa to Beijing.

When I last visited Tibet, people came up and begged me with tears in their eyes for a photo of their beloved exiled Dalai Lama. Beijing furiously brands him a “splittist.” I saw anti-Chinese demonstrations in Lhasa, and regiments of Chinese paramilitary police and soldiers. Resistance has simmered for decades. Now, the pot has boiled over.

In contrast to past heavy-handed repression, China has been fairly restrained so far in suppressing the rebellion. The uprising seems to be abating, but if it gets out of hand, China will use much more force.

Another danger: China’s giant rival, India, would dearly like to drive China from the strategic Tibetan Plateau, which looms over northern India. China has built a score of air and missile bases in Tibet threatening India. Growing unrest could tempt India to back Tibetan resistance. So might the U.S. China would react with fury.

So what can the world do? The EU calls for boycotting the Olympic opening ceremonies. Others demand trade sanctions.

OVERT ACTIONS

Such overt actions won’t work. China will never voluntarily relinquish control of Tibet. No one is going to tell China what to do.

The best solution is the Dalai Lama’s: Beijing restores the old “priest-ruler” relationship. Tibet recognizes China’s political mastery, China accepts Tibet’s real internal autonomy, ceases Han immigration, and allows the Dalai Lama to return.

As globalization plays an ever larger role in China’s economy, it needs to protect its good image abroad. Stomping on Tibet is counterproductive.

Beijing should respond with patience, and accord the Dalai Lama, a fierce pacifist and great soul, the same reverence and respect as did the Mongol and Ming emperors. The world needs to press China to do so, but discreetly, and with tact.

Reaping Tibet’s Whirlwind

March 2008

by Andrew Martin Fischer

No matter how hard Beijing tries to salvage its international public image and to convince its own domestic public otherwise, its public relations myth that all things are calm on its western Tibetan front, whether through military might or economic greed, has been shattered. The international media has treated the current crisis in Tibet as if it has happened suddenly, almost unexpectedly, out of the blue. Thus many ask, “How did this happen?” “Why now?” Unfortunately, many of us who have been researching Tibet for many years and have been visiting the region regularly have been sadly predicting the current events.

Beijing has been exacerbating conflictive tensions throughout the Tibetan areas with its “western development” strategies since the mid-1990s. These strategies include an all-out push for rapid growth with massive amounts of subsidies and subsidized investments channeled through Chinese corporations based outside the Tibetan areas; an open immigration policy; an absence of protection of local Tibetan employment despite severe educational lags and a severe undersupply of education infrastructure relative to the rest of China; and an assimilationist agenda within education policy.

In a nutshell, the very mechanisms by which Beijing has been attempting to resolve the “Tibet Question” through the force of rapid growth has in fact been reinforcing underlying political and social tensions due to the marginalization of Tibetans in the face of such growth.

In other words, Beijing has been trying to convince us that the marginally improving material conditions of the average Tibetan somehow absolve all previous sins. Yet superficial incantations of statistical indicators tell us little about people’s ability to control their lives within the context of the dramatic social and economic changes that lie behind such statistics. They tell us little about self-determination. They tell us little about disempowerment. And they tell us little about why people might become increasingly discontent amidst rising average levels of prosperity.

The underlying political and social tensions are obviously related to the fact that Tibet—all of Tibet, not just the Tibet Autonomous Region—is an occupied territory. Disputes of political history aside, the Tibetan areas are ruled by non-Tibetans, and this rule has been exercised through force rather than social consent, in the Maoist past as in the present “New China.” This is a problem that will not disappear, no matter how much Beijing continues to assert that Tibetans are in fact Chinese (i.e. citizens of China).

However, recent trends have sharply exacerbated this fundamental source of contention.

The first and most fundamental has been Beijing’s fast track strategy to “develop” Tibet through the force of massive amounts of subsidies and subsidized investments, the newly constructed railway being one such example. These strategies have resulted in rapidly rising inequalities, to a level much higher than that observed anywhere else in China, where rising inequality is already a source of great concern. Rising inequality is not only occurring between urban and rural areas, but also within the urban areas themselves, dismissing facile arguments that ethnic inequalities are merely a reflection of rural poverty.

The fact that subsidies and subsidized investments have been mostly channeled through the vehicle of (Han) Chinese companies based outside the Tibetan areas, or else through the government itself, results in an economic structure that rewards a small upper crust of the society, mostly based in the urban areas. This upper crust, which includes a minority of Tibetans, advantages those who are well positioned to access the flows of wealth passing through the region. I have likened this to “boomerang aid,” with the result that such aid often decapitates the agency of its intended beneficiary.

These strategies result in strong ethnic, cultural and even linguistic biases with growth. Those who profit handsomely possess Chinese fluency, good connections to economic and political centers in China Proper, and thrive in Chinese work cultures. However, only about 15% of the Tibetan population has some form of secondary education and thus some degree of Chinese fluency, given that Chinese-medium education generally only starts in secondary school. As a result, the remaining 85% are poorly positioned to integrate into the urban economic boom.

The second oft-noted trend is a corollary of the first; the in-migration of non-Tibetans (most Han Chinese) from elsewhere in China. The railway has increased the number of these migrants, although this is primarily due to subsidies, not the existence of the railway infrastructure itself. These migrants are coming to Lhasa because they can make large profits in the midst of the abnormal subsidy-induced economic bubble, not because they can travel more comfortably to Lhasa. This trend has been the focus of intense disputes, although they are purely an urban phenomenon and their importance can only be understood in the context of the larger economic policies.

The third trend has been the abandonment of most previously-existing mechanisms to protect local labor in the context of such out-of-province migrant inflows. This trend is particularly important because it affects the upward aspirations of many relatively well educated urban Tibetan youths. For instance, the government recently ended its policy of guaranteeing employment for local high school and university graduates. As elsewhere in China, the old system has been replaced with competitive exams for the coveted posts of state-sector employment, although the exams, as elsewhere in China, are in the Chinese language. As a result, even relatively well educated Tibetans are easily out-competed by Han Chinese migrants, even Han Chinese migrants from Chinese rural areas.

These policy changes therefore offer insight into why Tibetan youth in particular might feel so disaffected by current growth. For instance, in 2006 there was a large demonstration of Tibetan university graduates in Lhasa over the fact that out of 100 jobs that the government offered in open competition, only two were given to ethnic Tibetans. The government has generally responded to this situation by evoking a faith in the power of “the market” that would probably embarrass even Milton Friedman.

The fourth trend has been the tightening of political control by the government in response to rising tensions. This has especially been the case in the Tibetan areas of Sichuan, where increasing nationalistic agitation over the past several years has been a cause for alarm in both Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan, and Beijing. National and provincial governments across Tibet have responded by replacing existing leaders with more hard-line leaders and more repressive strategies of political control.

In this context of reaction and counter-reaction, what is utterly unprecedented in the demonstrations of last week was their duration. The fact that they turned violent on the fifth day in Lhasa appears to have been a popular reaction to the severity of repression carried out by the security forces during the previous four days of nonviolent protests.

What hope does the future hold? The international response has been muted and there is little hope for more, particularly in light of the fact that most governments around the world have recognized Tibet as part of China, and thus an internal affair of China. Rather, resolution must arise from within the seat of power—Beijing.

The crisis presents two possibilities. The Central Government can continue its fast track assimilationist development strategies that severely disadvantage, disempower and alienate the large majority of Tibetans, including many elite Tibetans.

Or else, after a period of looking tough and saving face, the Central Government might take the opportunity to critically introspect its dominant strategy of the last 20 years. Having deemed this a failure for the purpose of achieving harmony and stability, it might then turn to a more culturally sensitive and preferential development strategy, one that protects local Tibetan labor in the face of disadvantage and rapid change, and one that would be coordinated with Tibetan-medium education policies.

This is the core meaning of autonomy. Autonomy need not represent anything threatening to Beijing. In fact, the already-existing minority nationality laws of China could allow for many of the latter policies without any change to the Chinese constitution or legal regime. For instance, the existing laws could allow for the stipulation that state-sector employees working in minority nationality areas must have a degree of proficiency in the respective minority language. This would immediately give a strong competitive advantage to local Tibetans over non-Tibetan migrants and would also bolster support for a Tibetan-medium education system. Such a strategy would go a long way toward addressing many of the underlying grievances driving the current protests.

Indeed, some of these policies were permitted, tried and tested in parts of Tibet during the early reform period in the 1980s. However, Tibetan demonstrations and Tiananmen in 1989 brought an end to such experiments and the return of hardliners and their assimilationist agenda, this time under the guise of market socialism rather than Maoism.

Those who are cynical often suggest that Beijing has intentionally designed its policies to marginalize Tibetans and to assimilate them into the Motherland in a subordinated and even racist manner, perhaps in much the same way that the U.S., Canada and Australia had dealt with their own aboriginal populations throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. Perhaps, although some of us still carry hope that an element of humanism might reside within the socialist garb of the Chinese Communist Party. Or does the emperor really have no clothes?

Dr. Fischer, a fellow at the London School of Economics, is the author of “State Growth and Social Exclusion in Tibet: Challenges of Recent Economic Growth” (Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Press, 2005). This is the first in a series of articles on the ongoing crisis in Tibet.

Photographic evidence of the bloody crackdown at Ngaba County, Sichuan Province, on 16 March 2008

WARNING: EXTREMELY DISTURBING PICTURES.

Viewer discretion is advised. Pictures of extremely disturbing dead bodies with internal body part exposed. For higher resolution pictures contact Mr. Tashi Phuntsok, Information Officer at: 9418055622 Eye witnesses say 15 dead bodies have been brought into Ngaba Kirti Monastery for prayer offerings after the bloody crackdown on 16 March 2008. The actual number of dead can be higher.

View Link: http://www.tchrd.org/press/2008/pr20080318c.html

Lhasa Riots

By: Jigme Duntak

I see so many Chinese outraged by Tibetans who attacked these Chinese migrants inside Lhasa, and rightfully so, I am angered by it as well, but where was this same anger by these people when Tibetan children were shot at and even killed (one as young as 17) at Nangpa la Pass? Weren’t those Tibetans Chinese nationals under the Chinese law? Where was the remorse or coverage for them in the Chinese media? It all seems like a lopsided outpouring of sympathy to me.

At least in this case, where Tibetans attacked innocent civilians, those perpetrators can be found and punished for their actions. However when the Chinese government attacks their own citizens do we see the same justice? At Nangpa la pass the soldiers, who shot and killed Tibetan Chinese nationals who were 500 yards away, were excused under the pretext that they “acted in defense”.

It all seems absurd to me.

Riots and Unrest in Lhasa

Various sources on the happenings:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7296041.stm

http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/03/14/asia/china.php

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/mar/14/tibet.china3

http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1722509,00.html

http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20080314/ts_nm/china_tibet_dc_16

http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20080314/pl_afp/chinatibetreligionprotestsrightsusambassador_080314145403

http://in.reuters.com/article/southAsiaNews/idINIndia-32492120080314?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandChannel=0

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7299597.stm

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7299530.stm

Video:

http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/03/14/tibet.unrest/index.html#cnnSTCVideo

http://youtube.com/watch?v=2FtB_P-uWZI

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JZLzKBvvGMg

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/video/2008/mar/16/xiahe.gansu 

China: The Balance Sheet

Here is a few excerpts from China: The Balance Sheet by the Center For Strategic and International Studies and the Peter G. Peterson Institute For International Economics, an excellent book to answer many questions you might have about China’s rise. All in 161 pages too.

“According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, assuming current Chinese and U.S growth rates continue, China will become the world’s largest economy in thirty years. Its average income then would be about one-fourth of America’s. China would also be by far the world’s largest trading country. Its size alone would dominate Asia, and move it alongside the United States and European Union as a global economic superpower. But it could also be the first economic superpower in history that is relatively poor in per capita income terms and guided by a non-democratic political system”.

“Since the early 1990s, and accelerating in recent years, China has set out to comprehensively modernize its military: in doctrine, training, education, force structure, and overall operational capability. Beijing has implemented double-digit increases to its defense budget nearly every year since 1991; placing a growing emphasis on air, maritime, and strategic missile capabilities; streamlined the People’s Liberation Army to create a more professional efficient fighting force; attempted to improve joint interoperability; and upgraded its weapons platforms, primarily through foreign acquisitions”.

“Chinese leaders have no illusions that the People’s Liberation Army is a match for the U.S military. What China does seek are niche capabilities to exploit US vulnurabilities in order to deter, complicate, delay, if not defeat, U.S (or other) intervention in a Taiwan scenario. Beijing also seeks more broadly to prevent the United States and its allies from containing China’s economic and military development through military action or intimidation. While a Taiwan scenario may serve as a leading animating factor in China’s military modernization strategy, operational capabilities developed in the process may have broader application o assert Chinese territorial claims and other future interest beyond the Taiwan Strait”.

I’ll post up some of the issues the book brings up in future posts when I get to them, but for now I have some papers and things to do.

Here is the China Balance Sheet Website for more information on the book and project.