One other question that today’s charges bring up: how much is the Karmapa willing to put up with in India before he decides to try to find somewhere else to live? Is he even at liberty to leave India? He has been heavily restricted from visiting other countries, but that was on the assumption that he was still relying on their hospitality when he came back. I’m going to assume that India wouldn’t try to prevent him from leaving the country to live somewhere else permanently. If it did come to that, where would make a good home for the Karmapa? An obvious option would be the United States. The Karmapa already has a well-established headquarters in Woodstock, New York. He would have the opportunity to make an enormous impact on Buddhism in North America. By dint of its hegemonic position, the United States is more willing to stand up to Chinese political pressure than any other nation, so it would likely be willing to offer him asylum and not restrict his movements or activities. The downside, however, is that the Karmapa might be seen as aligning himself clearly with China’s main rival, which could undermine his ability to act as a go-between in negotiations with the Chinese government.

Living in Japan or Taiwan would probably offer fewer benefits to the Karmapa while evoking an even greater level of suspicion from the Chinese. Any of the other countries in East Asia are likely to be too intimidated by Chinese power to make amenable home for him.

Western Europe is another promising option. Perhaps the best home for the Karmapa would be in Switzerland, a small country famous for its neutrality. I understand there is already a small but active Tibetan exile community there. Perhaps the Karmapa could make an arrangement with the Swiss government to be able to create a monastery and a small settlement of his followers at some out-of-the-way location in Swiss Alps. The residents would mostly be monks interested to helping the Karmapa build a new home monastery in exile, but could also include some laypeople employed by the Karmapa’s organisation as well as some business owners and workers doing business with the other residents. This could benefit Switzerland by creating a unique cultural attraction (Tibet remains fashionable) and a lot of positive PR. It would also create an alternate center for the global Tibetan exile community, which could potentially be a useful hedge if, in the future, India becomes much less hospitable to the exile community there. A side benefit for the Karmapa, Ogyen Trinley Dorje, is that Western Europe so far has been the heartland of support for his rival, Trinlay Thaye Dorje. By establishing his headquarters, there he might be able to shift the region’s tendencies in his own favor.

The day when the Karmapa chooses to move away from India might be a long way away and it might never come, but the time to start planning for contingencies, I would say, is here already.

UPDATE: according to news reports, the Karmapa in principle could be sentenced to up to two years in prison. I still think this will never happen in a million years. Still, the threat of prison time could be very real for some of his advisers, which might encourage him to stay in India — the better to lobby for their release.

UPDATE 2: it occurs to me that moving his headquarters might be a good opportunity for the Karmapa to revamp his team of advisers. I’ve always had the gut feeling that there might be some shady characters around him. On the face of it, you’d think that someone like the Karmapa could just hire and fire staff at will, but in interpersonal relationships it’s always a little more complicated than that, especially given the limitations placed on the Karmapa by the Indian government. This incident could be an opportunity for a shake-up. Obviously, the Karmapa would still not want to leave his older advisers to languish in prison.

UPDATE 3: The more I think about, the choice of where the Karmapa would move if he left India depends a lot on what political rôle, if any, he expects to play in the future. If he expects not to be involved with politics at all, then there are many advantages to living in the United States. I think the Karmapa could have an enormous impact on Buddhism in North America. On the other hand, if the Karmapa is going to be involved in negotiations with the Chinese, then he would be better off not appearing to affiliate himself with the U.S. Switzerland is a country that is used as a symbol of neutrality. Incidentally, the Karmapa’s rôle in negotiations would be as an informal go-between and he would likely remain entirely in the background until after a deal was reached. The Karmapa’s value comes from the fact that he is probably perceived by the Chinese as more neutral and trustworthy than the Dalai Lama or the exile government are. The Karmapa should never have a formal position in the government-in-exile, nor does he need official approval from them to talk to the Chinese about politics (he should quietly coordinate with them behind the scenes). The distance between the Karmapa and the government-in-exile is a feature, not a bug: the CCP hates the idea of negotiating with a “government-in-exile”, so that makes the Karmapa the “good cop” by comparison. Even if everyone knows the Karmapa and TGIE are coordinating behind the scenes, the public presentation is still a face-saver for the Chinese government.

9. We underscore that the concurrent presence of all five BRICS countries in the Security Council during the year of 2011 is a valuable opportunity to work closely together on issues of peace and security, to strengthen multilateral approaches and to facilitate future coordination on issues under UN Security Council consideration. We are deeply concerned with the turbulence in the Middle East, the North African and West African regions and sincerely wish that the countries affected achieve peace, stability, prosperity and progress and enjoy their due standing and dignity in the world according to legitimate aspirations of their peoples. We share the principle that the use of force should be avoided. We maintain that the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of each nation should be respected.

Most of the world is pleased and inspired to see people in the Middle East working together to overthrow their corrupt governments. BRICS, of course, is “deeply concerned”. But I call BS on the statement, “We share the principle that the use of force should be avoided.” It makes it sound like they are pacifists. But, do you think the Chinese government will use force the next time Tibetan protesters take to the street with snow lion flags and calls for the Dalai Lama’s return? You betcha. Not only will they use force, but they will feel no need to apologize for it. Anybody who thinks about trying to pull a Tahrir Square on the People’s Republic had better get ready for some force coming their way.

Now, of course what the Sanya Declaration means is that they want regional monopolies on using force within the boundaries of the countries they rule. That’s fine. That’s the basis for the current status quo international regime. There’s a downside to it (China locking up Tibetan protestors, al-Assad in Syria having demonstrators shot, etc., etc.), but that’s the way things work. I just wish the BRICS would say what they mean instead of what sounds nice.

Not much that’s mentioned in these cables is very surprising, but it’s interesting to see what gets emphasised, i.e. what an American diplomat thought was interesting to talk about. It’s important to note that the Wikileaks cables are marked with the lowest level of secrecy in the U.S. system. Presumably, any really shocking news that diplomats wanted kept secret would be available only at higher security clearance levels.

Sautman writes, “Formal negotiations with the Dalai Lama are not being conducted, so it is not surprising that Beijing won’t discuss Tibet with his representatives in any but general terms.” Okay, fine, but is there any evidence that Beijing would ever have any interest in formal negotiations with the Dalai Lama? Hasn’t the Chinese government always been perfectly clear that they are interested in talking to representatives of the Dalai Lama about his personal status, and not about anything else? The Tibetan exiles have been less-than-perfect negotiating partners, but the Chinese have not been negotiating at all. The “negotiations” that the world requests China to hold with the Dalai Lama are about political reforms in Tibet. The Chinese government has said many times that they will not discuss that. Yes, the Chinese government has said that they want the Dalai Lama to do certain things, such as declaring that Tibet is an inalienable part of China, but when have they ever said that they will negotiate with him about autonomy if he complies? Granted, one would not necessarily expect them to say it in so many words, but is there any reason to think it’s true?

As an aside, I understand why the Chinese government wants the Dalai Lama to say that Tibet is an inalienable part of China, but that doesn’t change the fact that this is an incoherent concept. How can any place ever be an inalienable part of any state? You might argue that a government rules legitimately by consent of the governed, or by force, but either of those can change over time. Clearly what they want is for the Dalai Lama to promise not to agitate for independence in the future, but also they do not trust him and would not accept a promise. Also, I’m not sure why Sautman thinks it’s “bizarre” for the Tibetans to think that admitting Tibet is inalienably Chinese is tantamount to admitting that it is eternally Chinese. That sounds like exactly the sort of thing that Chinese sources could conflate, just as they are sloppy about the claims “Tibet has been part of China since the Qing dynasty” vs. “Tibet has been part of China since the Yuan dynasty” vs. “Tibet has always been part of China”. Would the Chinese government really be satisfied with a statement that Tibet suddenly became an inalienable part of China in 1951 or 1965, having been an independent country before that?

The Tibetan government-in-exile’s position is highly ambiguous, but it seems to boil down to the implication that they are currently the legitimate government of a rightfully independent Tibet, but they are willing to immediately and permanently cede their independence to China in return for genuine autonomy and democracy… as well downplaying their independence in the meantime. This position is a tricky balancing act and is not always graceful. It’s clear why they keep it up, though. They need something to put some pressure on China. They don’t want Beijing to simply ignore them. They need some kind of basis to justify negotiations when talking to other governments, the UN, and NGOs. If the CTA is not a government-in-exile, then what is it? Maybe this isn’t the best strategy, but simply to insist that they surrender what little leverage they have without suggesting an alternative doesn’t make much sense.

Sautman writes, “When Han and people of other ethnic groups were murdered in the streets and shops of Lhasa two years ago, Tibetan exile leaders claimed without evidence that the killings were carried out by disguised Chinese soldiers.” Okay, sure, people shouldn’t claim things with no evidence. But, within days of the March 14 violence, the Chinese media was claiming that that was all a plot by the Dalai Lama, also with no evidence. We could say that both sides are equally sloppy, except that the Chinese government has gone on to make the “Dalai plot” theory the central element of its media response to those protests and riots, repeating it ad nauseam.

“Thus, no matter how much others, especially in the West, credit the Dalai Lama’s disavowal of independence, the Chinese government will talk to, but not negotiate with him – as long as he stands apart from the United Nations and the world’s states by disavowing that Tibet is legitimately part of China.” Clearly, Beijing is unwilling to negotiate with the Dalai Lama now. Once again, where is the evidence that they would become willing to negotiate if he had a more consistently favorable attitude toward Chinese rule in Tibet?

One more thing about this passage: it’s true that the world’s governments and the UN have agreed that Tibet is part of China, but whoever said anything about “legitimate”? When did that enter into it? The international community has been very consistent about criticizing Chinese policies in Tibet and insisting that they liberalise and negotiate. Only China holds the position that the situation in Tibet is ducky. In this regard, they “stand apart” from the rest of the world just as much as the Tibetan government-in-exile does.

Sautman takes a moment to take a shot at the popular punching bag of “Greater Tibet”, “an entity that never existed historically”, according to Sautman. Of course, it did exist, albeit 1300 years ago, but that’s not the point. The request for an unified Tibetan region is justified on the grounds of the current interests and aspirations of the Tibetan people, not on the basis of history. Historical political arrangements are a red herring. The fact is that more than half of the Tibetan people live in Tibetan areas outside of the TAR. A plan that doesn’t do anything for them is no solution to the Tibet issue. As a compromise a solution, I suggest that the same reforms toward autonomy could be implemented in each of the Tibetan autonomous areas, even if they are not united into a single jurisdiction.

Sautman calls the Tibetan negotiating position, “negotiating with a tiger for its skin”. Really, though, Tibet is not a large part of China in terms of dollars or people, and an expanse of sparsely-populated land that isn’t very good for agriculture just isn’t worth much. China would hardly be left skinless even if it had a moment of conscience and allowed complete independence for Tibet. To talk about autonomy in these terms is hyperbolic.

“If, however, the Dalai Lama does agree to Beijing’s preconditions, there is plenty to talk about.” Indeed, there is plenty to talk about. But, at the risk of sounding like a broken record, what makes us think that Beijing actually will talk about those things if their preconditions are met? It’s true that the Dalai Lama could do more to show good faith. But when was the last time that the Chinese side did anything to show good faith? What argues against the conclusion that the Chinese are just interested in delaying and getting the Dalai Lama to help with their public relations problems while giving nothing in return?

Fortunately, Sautman gives us some details on what he expects the Chinese will be willing to talk about. “Beijing is not about to alter Tibet’s political status, erasing the borders between China’s Tibetan areas any time soon, or dilute the hegemony of the Communist Party.” Okay, that rules out a lot that one might want to talk about it. If I lived under the hegemony of the Communist Party, I sure would be interested in talking about getting rid of that, but let’s see what I might more realistically be able to expect. “It may, however, be willing to discuss a gradual expansion of the autonomy of Tibetan areas, including by incorporating non-separatist Tibetan exiles in key positions in these areas’ governing apparatuses. It may agree to remove restrictions on religious practice for officials, students and others, adopt additional measures aimed at fostering the Tibetan language and culture, make a more targeted effort to raise the incomes of ethnic Tibetans, and even restrict migration by non-Tibetans into Tibetan areas.” Okay, so that’s what we’re left with. A few things. Sautman keeps saying, “may”. I realise that he’s speculating here, so he can’t say for sure what might be agreed upon at the talks. That’s the problem. The Dalai Lama makes concessions up front, and Beijing makes concessions maybe in the future. Let’s make a leap of faith and assume that that’s what transpires. Now, then, what’s this business about “gradual expansion” of autonomy? So, even after the talks are completed, Tibet would still have to wait for these hypothetical Chinese concessions to be gradually implemented. Does that inspire confidence? Let’s remember that, according to the Chinese government, Tibet already enjoys autonomy. Who knows what “gradual expansion of autonomy” would really mean coming from them?

“… incorporating non-separatist Tibetan exiles in key positions in these areas’ governing apparatuses” totally misses the point, which is to reform the nature of the apparatus itself. What is the current “governing apparatus” of Tibet? Tibet is ruled from the center, so, in practice, its governing apparatus is the Politburo of the Communist Party of China. Is the Tibetan branch of the party going to become independent from the central party, or is the Tibetan “people’s government” going to become independent of the party? Remember, we are not supposed to be diluting the party’s hegemony here. Without cutting the puppet-strings that lead from Lhasa to Zhongnanhai, the fact is that having “key positions” in the governing apparatus means nothing. Back in the 1950s, the Dalai Lama was the chairman of what became the TAR government, and that proved to be a position of very little authority. Richard McGregor’s recent, much-lauded book The Party details the complex strategies the Chinese Communist Party uses to maintain their grip on power. They know how to work around any number of figurehead officials.

Sautman then observes, “Because of the history of separatism, Beijing is not going to make the Tibetan areas into another Hong Kong, in which only local people are political leaders and a high degree of autonomy allows for a system markedly different from the rest of the country.” Which I think is what this comes down to. Beijing has no interest in high-level autonomy for Tibet, like what Hong Kong currently has, because they don’t trust the Tibetan people. The fear is that any concessions in the direction of autonomy will simply make the Tibetan public more assertive; the more they loosen their grip, the more likely the situation is to spiral out of control, leading either to independence or a renewed crackdown. The alternatives are to figure out a deal with the Dalai Lama now, since he can keep a lid on things, or continue with the status quo. The current Chinese leadership is committed to the status quo option, apparently with the idea that the issue will fade away once the 14th Dalai Lama is out of the picture. That’s wishful thinking.

Rigpe Dorje (left), Dorjee Galtsen, Tenzin Kalden and Tenzing Chaeyang relax after playing basketball at an outdoor court in Parkdale. Della Rollins for The Globe and Mail

In Parkdale, like other inner-city communities in Toronto,basketball is social glue. When mentors try to impart life lessons to kids here, they often do it with basketball.

– “Economics: It is relatively cheap to pursue basketball, both as a hobby and a competitive thing. Compared to, say, lacrosse or hockey, you don’t need to pay much for equipment, training, courts, etc. The most you have to pay for are sneakers,” according to Gelek Badmaashtsang, another friend of Mr. Duntak. Parkdale is “a dense, urban place…Young Tibetans who live in Parkdale naturally gravitate towards hoops because of the area they live in.”

See the article here

Below are some of my responses to the points he raised:

This guy doesn’t know as much about the subject as he apparently thinks he does, which is disappointing coming from a professor.

There have been two major independence-seeking/Anti-Han movements, one happened during the Revolution of 1911, when the British attempted to negotiate with central government (ROC) as a representative of Tibet.

This is confused. The 13th Dalai Lama declared Tibet’s independence unilaterally in 1913, in the immediate aftermath of the revolution that overthrew the Qing (in fact, what he declared is that Tibet had been independent all along). The professor is presumably thinking of the Simla Accord of 1914, in which the British prevailed on the ROC to hold three-way negotiations with Tibet and Great Britain. They actually did not merely “attempt to negotiate” with the ROC, they really did negotiate for quite a while, although in the end the Chinese did not sign the accord.

Why would the British have negotiated with the ROC during the revolution in 1911, anyway?

The other occurred in 1949, also supported by the British, along with some Indian intervention. It failed and the DL, as a local delegate, signed the Seventeen Point Agreement with the central government (PRC).

If this corresponds to anything that actually happened, it would be Tibet’s desperate (and very tardy) efforts to get international recognition by the UN and the powerful states in order to stave off a Chinese invasion. However, the British did not support that effort, which is one of the main reasons that it failed. The main reason the British didn’t support it was because the recently independent government of India actively opposed it. If the professor wanted a talking point, he should have claimed that Tibetan independence was supported at this time by the Americans, who were somewhat more interested in the idea. In fact, Tibet’s only active supporter at that time was actually El Salvador.

The 1959 riot was backed up by the CIA and India.

False but getting warmer. The riot and general uprising in Lhasa in 1959 occurred on its own. The CIA had been providing some support to the Khampa rebellion, which also began on its own, for at least a year or two beforehand, and they quickly moved in to support the rebellion in central Tibet which followed the uprising in Lhasa. I can’t imagine what would be dishonorable about accepting outside aid at that point.

One particular case in point is that the 1959 suppression was often distorted as an invasion (at least, some westerners I knew consider it as an act of invasion).

That’s true. A lot of not-so-knowledgeable people in the west think that China invaded Tibet in 1959. In fact, they invaded in 1951 (after seizing eastern Tibetan territories with very little resistance in 1949-50). Western people tend to be very confused by the period of tense cooperation in the 1950s.

The Seventeen Point Agreement, which had a clear regulation of Tibet’s autonomous status and its relations with central government, is barely mentioned in books published in western world.

The main reason people don’t spend much time talking about the Seventeen Point Agreement is that, overall, it was not very important. It was never an agreement, since one side was forced to “agree” to it. I don’t think that either side ever really intended to live up to their side of the deal: the Chinese government intended to abrogate the Seventeen Point Agreement by gradually replacing it with a party-controlled administration, and the Tibetans intended to keep as much autonomy as possible regardless of what the Seventeen Point Agreement said.

The management of Tibet since 1949 was based on autonomous system and the Seventeen Point Agreement until 1959.

Both sides were attempting to undermine that system all along. The Chinese created PCART, the Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet, in 1956, at which point their plans were no longer a secret.

The cause of the 1959 uprising can be partially explained by land reforms and ownership reforms implemented in some Tibetan-inhabited areas outside the Tibet Autonomous Region. However, those reformed areas has nothing to do with the Tibet Autonomous Region, where the DL was in charge.

And yet, Chinese sources very consistently argue that the 1959 uprising was instigated by nobles who opposed land reform. The professor is correct that land reform actually had nothing to do with it, but he doesn’t seem to realise that this undermines his own government’s propaganda.

That being said, the central government did not necessarily break the Seventeen Point Agreement. Some Tibetan separatists and Americans took advantage of this situation, but it doesn’t make any sense that some [regular] Tibetans did the same thing. (The ultra-Leftist trend during cultural revolution was also a contributing factor to their resentment)

Understatement of the decade! But his point here is very unclear, since obviously the uprising in 1959 happened prior to the Cultural Revolution.

The whole thing is for sure deliberately plotted and prepared.

Pure gullibility. If the Chinese government had any evidence at all, even circumstantial evidence, that the Dalai Lama had planned, surely they would have made it public by now and would use be using it as a talking point ad nauseam.

First, peaceful demonstration (March.10th), violence next (13rd), then there comes the Olympic torch relay.

He is confused about the sequence of events. Peaceful demonstrations did begin on March 10, but violence also began the same day, when Chinese security forces arrested and severely beat a group of peaceful protestors. Apparently, violence by the Chinese government is invisible to this writer. Violence by Tibetans began on March 14 in Lhasa and on the 15th in Xiahe (not sure how he managed to get this part wrong, since Chinese sources often refer to these events as 3/14 – the events of the preceding days having slipped down the memory hole).

The perfect timing and media’s one-sided response are not a coincidence. I am not suggesting here that it was plotted by a specific government; the international community is increasingly complicated as globalization evolves.

Not at all clear what he is suggesting here.

In regard to western media, they interpret the Tibet issue based on their own perceptions

I guess everyone tends to interpret issues based on their own perceptions. The Western media’s coverage was deeply flawed, but this professor might want to take a good long look in the mirror himself.

Those trouble-makers are not a big deal.

I agree that the Tibetan resistance is not a big deal – for the foreseeable future – as long as you don’t care what sort of tactics Beijing has to use to keep a lid on things.

Tibet is not my specialization and the latest research is not something I am aware of.

Damn straight it isn’t.

I have been studying in the international sphere for years and my personal experience is westerners are unaware of many issues.

Total strawman. Most people anywhere are unaware of many issues. However, at least most people are not professors who try to put themselves forward as informed commenters on those issues.